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All political scientists offer us their interpretations of the
world.  Interpretive approaches differ from many others in that
they offer us interpretations of interpretations; they concen-
trate on meanings, beliefs, languages, discourses, and signs,
as opposed to, say, laws and rules, correlations between social
categories, or deductive models.  Of course, this distinction
between interpretive approaches and others is not an all or
nothing affair: sensible interpretivists allow that the study of
laws, correlations, and models can play a role in our explora-
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Endnotes
1Thanks to Mark Bevir, John Gerring, and Alison Kaufman for
their helpful comments on drafts of this essay.
2A longer discussion would need to consider whether there is
also a third, more dialectical way of fleshing out intersubjectivity
that overcomes the dichotomizing of possibilities that I engage in
here.  On my reading, Wedeen’s (2002) effort to sketch out a space
between Geertz and methodological individualism explores just this
option.  However, whether or not we choose to add a third dialecti-
cal interpretivism to the structuralist and intentionalist variants fo-
cused on here, I do think that we should avoid the limiting of possi-
bilities (and the scope for disagreement and debate) within
interpretivism implied by Wedeen’s occasional framing of method-
ological individualism and interpretivism as exclusive positions (ex.
2002: 718).  Where, after all, would that leave Weber?
3Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948); Berelson, Lazarsfeld,
McPhee (1954).  Lazarfeld’s engagements with such standard-issue
“interpretive” concerns as the theory of action and critical theory
should challenge any notion that systematic quantitative research is
necessarily incompatible with such engagements.  In particular, see
the essays collected in Lazarsfeld, 1975.
4For such a dichotomy, see Hollis and Smith (1990).
5The elaboration of such a conception has been a longstanding
concern of some philosophers and political theorists.  See Skinner
(1972), Moon (1975), Searle (1983), Farr (1987), Fay (1996), and
Bevir (1999).
6For a recent presentation of rational-choice as following the
form of intentional explanation, see Fearon and Wendt (2002).
disagreement on the recurring issues of methodological indi-
vidualism vs. holism than are non-interpretivists.  These dis-
agreements lead into a divergence between structuralist and
intentionalist ways of explicating what attention to
intersubjectivity involves in the study of meanings.  Structur-
alist interpretivism postulates intersubjective meaningful struc-
tures or quasi-structures, and construes the classic interpre-
tive task of understanding in terms of the “thick description”
(Geertz 1973) of these structures.  Intentionalist interpretivism
approaches meanings as intentional states of individual minds,
to be understood by locating them within the broader network
of an individual’s other intentional states and in a concrete
context of social practices and interactions with others.  Ap-
proached in this way, the task of understanding is in turn an
essential prerequisite for meeting the demands of an inten-
tional conception of explanation giving in the human sciences.
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isolated attitude; rather, we must interpret it in relation to a
whole set of beliefs and desires.  A wide range of political
scientists typically treat beliefs, meanings, ideas, norms, and
the like as if, first, they could be differentiated from actions,
and, second, they could be related individually to actions.
Interpretivists stand out somewhat in their insistence that mean-
ings or beliefs form holistic webs which are constitutive of
actions and so practices.
Interpretivists share with one another sympathy for bot-
tom-up forms of social inquiry as well as a focus on meanings
or beliefs.  Typically they believe that people in the same situ-
ation can hold very different beliefs if only because their ex-
periences of that situation can be laden with very different
prior theories.  No abstract concept, such as a class or an insti-
tution, can properly explain people’s beliefs, interests, or ac-
tions; rather, it can represent only an abstract stand-in for the
multiple and complex beliefs and actions of the individuals
we classify under it.  Interpretivists often conclude, for such
reasons, that practices require bottom-up studies of the ac-
tions and beliefs out of which they emerge.  No doubt
constructivist institutionalists are more willing than
poststructuralists to bypass bottom-up studies so as to focus
on the way institutions operate in a given setting.  Yet even
when constructivists postulate institutional unity, they usually
conceive of it as an emergent property based on individual
actions in the context of intersubjective norms, which, at least
in principle, could be contested.  Interpretivists favor bottom-
up studies of the ways in which social practices are created,
sustained, and transformed through the interplay and contest
of the beliefs and meanings embedded in human activity.
Another theme shared by interpretivists is an emphasis
on the contingency of social life.  Typically they believe that
because people in any given situation can interpret that situa-
tion and their interests in all sorts of ways, political scientists
are pressed to allow that no practice or norm can fix the ways
in which its participants will act, let alone how they will inno-
vate in response to novel circumstances.  Our practices are
thus radically contingent in that they lack any fixed essence or
logical path of development.  This emphasis on the contin-
gency of social life explains why interpretivists denaturalize
alternative theories.  Interpretivists believe that political sci-
entists efface the contingency of social life when they attempt
to ground their theories in apparently given facts about the
nature of reasoning, the path-dependence of institutions, or
the inexorability of social developments; and they therefore
try to expose these facets of social life as contingent if other
social scientists represent them as natural or inexorable.
Even as interpretivists exhibit these family resemblances,
so they are engaged in family quarrels.  Important questions
arise here, I believe, over the composition and the recentring
of practices.  The problem is that interpretivists are confused
about the nature of the meanings that inform actions and prac-
tices.  Sometimes meanings appear to exist as quasi-structures
governed by a semiotic code or random fluctuations of power.
At other times meanings are understood in terms of the beliefs
of individuals, with the concept of an ideology, discourse or
language referring only to a cluster of intersubjective beliefs.
tion of practices; and sensible institutionalists, behavioralists,
and rational choice theorists allow that their typologies, cor-
relations, and models can do explanatory work only in so far
as they can be unpacked in terms of the actual beliefs and
desires of actors.  Nonetheless, we can distinguish a family of
interpretive approaches to political science that stand out in
that they focus on meanings and beliefs – a family that in-
cludes decentred theory, ethnography, poststructuralism, prac-
tical philosophy, and social constructivism, and that overlaps
with other approaches such as the constructivist and ideational
forms of institutionalism.
Interpretivists are far from alone, of course, in paying at-
tention to meanings or beliefs.  They are more distinct, surely,
in the extent to which they imply that political science is about
meanings or beliefs, as we might say, all the way down.
Interpretivists account for meanings or beliefs by locating them
in wider webs of meanings or beliefs in large part, I suspect,
because of assumptions about, first, the constitutive nature of
beliefs in relation to actions and, second, the holistic nature of
beliefs or meanings.  Consider the constitutive nature of be-
liefs in relation to actions.  When other political scientists study
voting behavior by means of surveys of the attitudes of voters,
or models of rational action given certain beliefs and prefer-
ences, they differentiate meanings or beliefs from actions in
order to seek a correlation or deductive link between the two.
Interpretivists often suggest, in contrast, that such surveys and
models cannot tell us why, say, raising one’s hand should
amount to voting, or why there would be uproar if someone
forced someone else to raise their hand against their will, or
why only certain people should be regarded as eligible to vote.
We can explain these sorts of things, they continue, only if we
appeal to the intersubjective beliefs that underpin the practice
of concern to us: we need to know, for example, that voting is
associated with making a free choice and so with a particular
concept of the self; and we need to know what counts as an
infringement of free choice and who is regarded as being ca-
pable of making such a choice.  Practices and beliefs are con-
stitutive of one another: practices could not exist if people did
not have appropriate beliefs; and beliefs or meanings would
not make sense in the absence of the practices to which they
refer.
Consider now the holistic nature of meanings or beliefs.
Many interpretivists imply that people hold beliefs for rea-
sons of their own, so we can make sense of their beliefs only
by locating them in the context of the other beliefs that pro-
vide reasons for their holding them.  Hence, they argue that
even if other political scientists established a correlation be-
tween, say, a positive attitude to social justice and voting Demo-
crat, they still could not properly explain people’s voting Demo-
crat by reference to this attitude; after all, people who have a
positive attitude to social justice still might vote Republican if
they believe still more strongly in conservative values, or if
they believe the Democrats will not implement their policies.
To grasp why someone with a positive attitude to social jus-
tice votes Democrat, we have to unpack the other relevant
beliefs and desires that relate that attitude to that vote.  To
explain an action, we cannot merely correlate it with a single
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scriptive ones.  The more we emphasize the contingency and
particularity of beliefs, actions, and practices, the harder it
becomes to explain them by reference to an aggregate concept
or a social process.  Indeed, if interpretivists deploy discourse
or power to do explanatory work, these concepts are liable to
imply a neglect of agency – if a discourse purports to explain
a pattern of belief or speech, the implication is surely that the
discourse defines, rather than just limits, the content of the
beliefs or intentions people can hold – and this neglect of
agency will be likely to lead to further confusions.  For ex-
ample, the use of discourse as an explanatory concept would
appear to imply a determinism that can barely account for
change: if individuals arrive at beliefs, and even construct them-
selves, in accord with a fixed and disembodied ideology, they
appear to lack the capacity to modify that ideology, so such
modifications seem to be inexplicable.  Of course,
interpretivists sometimes criticize structuralism for exhibit-
ing just such determinism while implying that they themselves
view such transformations in terms of an instability that is
inherent within the structure – an instability that threatens the
structure and puts it into contradiction with itself; but, alas, in
doing so, they merely elide the question of whether we are to
understand such instabilities, contradictions, and transforma-
tions as necessary qualities of a disembodied discourse or as
contingent properties and products of individual subjects, their
beliefs, their reasoning, and their action.
Interpretivists struggle to recenter their theories of gover-
nance in ways that have explanatory power.  They might do so
by drawing on the contrast between agency and autonomy.
When we reject autonomy, we accept that individuals neces-
sarily experience the world in ways that reflect the influence
on them of a tradition, ideology, or discourse.  Hence our ex-
planatory concepts should indicate how social influences per-
meate beliefs and actions even on those occasions when the
speaker or actor does not recognize such influence.  To accept
agency is, however, to imply that people possess the capacity
to adopt beliefs and actions, even novel ones, for reasons of
their own, where these beliefs and actions then can transform
the social background.  Interpretivists might be well advised,
therefore, to think of the social context in terms of, say, tradi-
tions rather than language or discourse: after all, the concept
of a tradition evokes a social structure in which individuals
are born and which then acts as the background to their beliefs
and actions even while they might modify, develop, and even
reject much of their inheritance.  At the very least,
interpretivists should care that use of concepts such as lan-
guage, discourse, and power/knowledge does not lead them to
neglect agency and individual reasoning either in their abstract
theorizing or in their analyses of political practices.
More often than I would like, interpretivists combine these
analyses of meaning by paying-lip service to the capacity for
agency while writing empirical studies that concentrate on the
ways in which traditions and practices create forms of subjec-
tivity to the almost total exclusion of the ways in which agents
create traditions and practices.
Many interpretivists concentrate on the construction of
individuals because they want to repudiate autonomy.  How-
ever, we should distinguish here between autonomy and
agency.  Autonomous individuals are able, at least in prin-
ciple, to have experiences, to reason, to adopt beliefs, and to
act outside all contexts.  Agents, in contrast, can reason and
act in novel ways, albeit only against the background of con-
texts that influence them.   Most interpretivists reject autonomy
because they believe, say, that all experiences and all reason-
ing embody theories, so people can adopt beliefs only against
the background of a prior set of theories, which, at least ini-
tially, must be made available to them by a social discourse or
tradition.  However – and this is significant – this rejection of
autonomy does not entail a rejection of agency.  On the con-
trary, we can accept that people always set out against the back-
ground of a social discourse or tradition and still conceive of
them as agents who can act and reason in novel ways so as to
modify this background.  Even if a linguistic context forms
the background to people’s statements, and a social context
forms the background to their actions and practices, the con-
tent of their statements and actions does not come directly
from these contexts; it comes instead from the ways in which
they replicate, use, or respond to these contexts in accord with
their intentions.
The confusion among interpretivists on the nature of mean-
ings reappears in the ways in which they suggest political sci-
entists might recentre bottom-up studies.  On the one hand,
because interpretivists sometimes appear to reduce meaning
and agency to a semiotic code, they can seem to use concepts
such as discourse and power/knowledge as ways of recentring
accounts of practices.  On the other, their emphases on contin-
gency and particularity can inspire a concern to challenge the
validity, or at least naturalness, of all terms of recentering,
including presumably those of discourse and power/knowl-
edge.  No doubt interpretivists, like everyone else, should use
the abstract concepts that they believe best describe the world.
If they find that networks are multiplying, they might invoke
a “network society”; if they find that people are increasingly
dealing with risk through personalized health plans, pension
provisions, and the like, they might invoke an “individualiz-
ing power”; and if they find that a group of people express
similar ideas, such as a belief in freedom, the market, the im-
portance of the consumer, and the need to roll back the state,
they might invoke a “discourse of the New Right”.  In gen-
eral, if our aggregate concepts are merely descriptive, the worth
we attach to them will depend on whether or not we believe
the broad patterns exist.  However – and this too is significant
– if they are merely descriptive, they do not do explanatory
work.
So, the question of recentering becomes awkward for
interpretivists with respect to explanatory concepts, not de-
